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I. INTRODUCTION

At the end-indeed on the last night-of the 1994 legislative session,
the Florida Legislature passed a law authorizing the State to seek
reimbursement for Medicaid-generated medical expenses.' The article

* Cone, Wagner, Nugent, Johnson, Hazouri & Roth Professor of Law, University of
Florida College of Law. B.B.A., 1950, University of Michigan; LL.B., 1956, Boston University
School of Law; LL.M., Yale Law School.
1. 1994 Fla. Laws ch. 94-251 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 16.59, 409.907, 409.910 (Supp.
1994)).
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by Professor Van Alstyne, Denying Due Process in the Florida Courts:
A Commentary on the 1994 Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act of
Florida,' suggests that the Act presents significant issues of
constitutionality under the Constitution of the United States.3 The Act
may also fall short of complying with the Florida Constitution.4 It is not
my aim here to discuss the constitutional issues. Nor will I address the
need or desirability of the State to look outside traditional federal and
state funding for the Medicaid program.5 Anyone who pays moderate
attention to current events knows that a wide array of public welfare
programs, including Medicaid, are in deep trouble. Rather, my purpose
is to try to determine just how the Act goes about implementing its
stated goal of looking to outside sources for reimbursement of Medicaidgenerated medical expenses. I will also express some thoughts on
whether the Act is the best way to impose medical expense liability on
those outside sources.
The State of Florida has already brought suit against a variety of
defendants. 6 Although the 1995 Florida Legislature repealed the Act,7
the Governor of Florida vetoed the repealing Act.' Perhaps as a hedge
against repeal, the Complaint alleges causes of action "in both equity
and common law" as well as under the Act.9 Indeed, other states have

2. William W. Van Alstyne, Denying Due Process in the Florida Courts: A Commentary
on the 1994 Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act of Florida,46 FLA. L. REV. 563 (1994).
3. See id. at 564-65, 583-87.
4. A declaratory judgment action challenging the Act on a variety of grounds, both
federal and state, has been filed by several plaintiffs. See Associated Indus. of Fla., Inc. v.
Florida, Civ. No. 94-3128 (Fla. 2d Cir. filed June 30, 1994), appeal docketed, No. 86,213 (Fla.
Aug. 9, 1995).
5. A bill authorizing the United States Attorney General to pursue similar claims for
reimbursement of federal health care expenditures made necessary by a condition caused by the
use of tobacco products was introduced into the Senate in 1994. See S. 2245, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1994).
6. Florida v. American Tobacco Co., Civ. No. 95-1466AO (Fla. 15th Cir. Feb. 21, 1995).
This case has been stayed pending the outcome of Florida v. Associated Indus. of Fla., Inc., No.
86,213 (Fla. filed Aug. 9, 1995). American Tobacco Co. (Civ. No. 95-1466AO) (order granting
stay).
7. Fla. SB 42 (1995).
8. FLA. LEGIs., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1995 REGULAR SESSION,
HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS at 36, SB 42.

9. Complaint 3, American Tobacco Co. (Civ. No. 95-1466AO). Indeed, one of the
lawyers representing the State recently observed that the Act "merely codified common law,"
and thus is not necessary for the success of the suit. See Claudia MacLachlan, Recent Tobacco
Rulings Give Both Sides the Jitters, NAT'L L.J., June 12, 1995, at BI, B3. But in West Virginia,
a trial judge, in dismissing most of the State's claims for Medicaid reimbursement, ruled that
the State Attorney General had no common law authority to bring the action. See Claudia
MacLachlan, Cigarette Makers Claim Gain in Court, NAT'L L.J., May 15, 1995, at B 1.
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brought similar actions without statutory authority.'
Based on the discussion surrounding the adoption of the Act, the
Legislature's clear purpose in enacting it was to seek reimbursement of
medical expenditures made on behalf of recipients that are attributable
to.cigarette smoking." Although the Act itself is not so limited, most
of the discussion in this commentary will involve such manufacturers.
II. THE NATURE OF THE STATUTORY CAUSE OF ACTION
The Act is very confusing, and shows all the earmarks of the lastminute, inadequately considered legislation that it is. The nature of the
cause, or causes, of action that are authorized by the Act is not clear.
The Act carries forward the right of the State to subrogation against
those who have caused the need for Medicaid medical expenses and
who are liable to the recipient on any theory. 2 Subrogation is a legal
device by which one person, the subrogee, has paid money to another
person, the subrogor, which should have been paid by a third person. 3
It is said that the subrogee "stand[s] in the shoes" of the subrogor, and
enforces the subrogor's right to payment.'4 Subrogation commonly
arises in insurance contexts, in which the insurer has paid the insured,
pursuant to the policy, an amount the insured is also entitled to recover
from someone else.' 5 For example, a property damage carrier may pay
its insured for damage to an automobile arising from an accident in
which another person is liable to the insured in tort. The insurer is
subrogated to the right that the insured has to recover from that other
person. 6
In the Medicaid context, the pre-1994 Medicaid statute specifically
provided for subrogation on behalf of the State "to any rights that an
applicant, recipient, or legal representative has to any third-party benefit
10. Claims have been filed against tobacco companies by the States of Mississippi, see
Michael Janofsky, Mississippi Seeks Damagesfrom Tobacco Companies, N.Y. TIMES, May 24,
1994, at A12, and Minnesota, see Barry Meier, Health InsurerJoins Minnesota'sSuit Against

Tobacco Producers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1994, at BIO. As the latter headline indicates, a
health insurer also seeks reimbursement of tobacco-related insurance payments in the Minnesota
suit. See id.
11. See, e.g., Tim Nickens, Floridain Forefrontof Smoking Fight, MIAMI HERALD, May
27, 1994, at IA.
12. See FLA. STAT. § 409.910(1) (Supp. 1994).
13. See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDDIS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES 219 (1988).
14. Id.
15. Id.

16. Id. Professor Van Alstyne's hypotheticals, and his analysis of them, suggest that he
views subrogation as at least one theory of recovery established by the Act. See Van Alstyne,
supra note 2, at 567-71.
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for the full amount of medical assistance provided by Medicaid."' 7 This
subrogation right was not changed by the 1994 Act.'
It seems unlikely, however, that the State will pursue the claim
against the tobacco manufacturers by way of subrogation,
notwithstanding the subrogation language in the statute. The statute
specifically provides that the State's recovery is not to be affected by
the defenses, such as comparative negligence, normally applicable in an
action brought by or through the injured persons. 9 Proceeding by way
of subrogation also would raise a number of procedural problems.
Would the State, for example, be able to present a subrogation claim
against the defendants separate from any tort claims brought by the
recipients for their personal injuries? Would the ability of the State to
pursue a subrogation action in Florida be affected by the class action
filed in Louisiana against cigarette manufacturers on behalf of "all
nicotine dependent persons," their representatives and families?"
Even though a subrogation claim against the tobacco companies is
theoretically possible under the Act, the principal thrust of the Act, as
reflected in the Complaint,2 is to create an independent action in the
State.22 But the nature of the independent action is not clear. Does the
Act create an entirely new cause of action in the State, apart from any
cause of action the recipients may have? Or does recovery by the State
depend on a wrong to the recipients, thus making the right of the State
in some sense derivative from that of the recipients?
A theory of recovery entirely independent of any wrong to the
recipients could take either of two forms, neither of which is very likely.
One theory of recovery might be based on cause. It would not be
necessary for the State to prove that the defendants committed any
wrong-only that they caused a condition requiring medical expenses
compensated through Medicaid. Or it might be that the Act requires a
wrong, but one to the State and not to the recipients. If a wrong is
required, the Act certainly does not define what such a wrong might be.
17. FLA. STAT. § 409.910(6)(b) (1993).
18. See FLA. STAT. § 409.910(6)(b) (Supp. 1994).

19. Id. § 409.910(1).
20. See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544, 549 (E.D. La. 1995)
(certifying the class). Whether that decision will survive on appeal is open to question. See In
re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1304 (7th Cir. 1995) (refusing certification of a
class composed of hemophiliacs who alleged that they were infected with HIV as a result of
using blood concentrate manufactured by the defendants).
21. See Complaint, American Tobacco Co. (Civ. No. 95-1466AO).
22. FLA. STAT. § 409.910(6)(a) (Supp. 1994) provides that the State "has a cause of action
against a liable third party to recover the full amount of medical assistance provided by
Medicaid, and such cause of action is independent of any rights or causes of action of the
recipient." Id.
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There is some support for the conclusion that the Act requires the
State to prove that the defendants committed some established wrong to
the recipients, from which the State derives its right to recover. The Act
authorizes the State to seek reimbursement from "liable third parties,"23
a term that is not defined in the Act. But the term, and the absence of
any definition, does suggest that recovery may be had from those who
are liable apart from the Act-that is, those who would have been, and
are, liable to the recipients on some theory that predates the Act. On this
view, the Act creates a new plaintiff for an old cause of action, and not
a new cause of action as such. And to the extent that the Complaint
sheds any light on the matter, the counts are all phrased in traditional
tort terms. My discussion here will proceed on the assumption that the
Act does not create an entirely new cause of action.
The provision added by the Act that creates the State's cause of
action is:
(9) In the event that medical assistance has been
provided by Medicaid to more than one recipient, and the
agency elects to seek recovery from liable third parties due
to actions by the third parties or circumstances which
involve common issues of fact or law, the agency may
bring an action to recover sums paid to all such recipients
in one proceeding. In any action brought under this
subsection, the evidence code shall be liberally construed
regarding the issues of causation and of aggregate damages.
The issue of causation and damages in any such action may
be proven by use of statistical analysis.
(a) In any action under this subsection wherein the
number of recipients for which medical assistance has been
provided by Medicaid is so large as to cause it to be
impracticable to join or identify each claim, the agency
shall not be required to so identify the individual recipients
for which payment has been made, but rather can proceed
to seek recovery based upon payments made on behalf of
an entire class of recipients.
(b) In any action brought pursuant to this subsection
wherein a third party is liable due to its manufacture, sale,
or distribution of a product, the agency shall be allowed to
proceed under a market share theory, provided that the
products involved are substantially interchangeable among
brands, and that substantially similar factual or legal issues
would be involved in seeking recovery against each liable

23. Id. § 409.910(9).
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third party individually.
If, as I have suggested, this Act does not create an entirely new
theory of recovery, what sorts of existing theories of recovery, involving
wrongs to the Medicaid recipients, are available to the State? In the
following discussion, I will focus primarily on what might be
characterized as traditional products liability actions, although I will
mention briefly other theories set out in the Complaint.
A. Products Liability-The Requirement of a Defect
Under traditional products liability law--even under strict
liability-it is not enough for the plaintiff to prove that a product made
and sold by the defendant caused the plaintiff's harm. The product must
be defective in some way as well.25
The tentative draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability (Restatement of Products Liability) 6 has adopted what has
emerged as the uniformly accepted categorization of product defects. A
product may be defective because it has a manufacturing defect, there
was inadequate warning of non-obvious dangerous characteristics, or the
design was unreasonably unsafe.27 Thus, the mere fact that cigarettes
cause harm does not make them defective.28
So far, no one has claimed that the harm caused by cigarette
smoking results from manufacturing defects-unintended departure of
cigarettes from their design. Indeed, the complaint is that cigarettes
are harmful because that is the way they are designed. One theory that
plaintiffs have relied on to characterize cigarettes is that the

24. Id.
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). This section imposes liability on
"[o]ne who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer." The Supreme Court of Florida has specifically turned to § 402A as a source of
products liability law. See West v. Caterpillar Traqtor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 84 (Fla. 1976).
26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1995)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY]. Several sections of this Restatement,
including § 2, were tentatively approved at the May 1995 meeting of the American Law
Institute.
27. Id. § 2. In Cheshire Medical Ctr. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 49 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1995),
the court rejected the plaintiff's theory that recovery was proper on a single product defect
theory even in the absence of proof of a manufacturing, design, or warning defect. Id. at 36.
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965) ("Good tobacco is not
unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may be harmful .... ").
29. This is not to say that such a claim might not be possible. See Ronald Smothers,
Recall of ContaminatedCigarettesLeaves Many Smokers Unfazed, N.Y. TIMES, June 2. 1995,
at A 18. An impurity in a chemical used in the filters of cigarettes manufactured by Philip Morris
causes "dizziness and irritation of the eyes, nose and throat." Id.
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manufacturers did not warn users of the hazards of smoking. °
However, the ability of a plaintiff to recover for cigarette-caused injury
on a warning theory has been circumscribed by Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., which held that state law cannot impose on cigarette
manufacturers a duty to warn inconsistent with the congressionallymandated warning that now appears on cigarette packages." This
federal preemption, however, did not extend to all claims arising out of
cigarette related injury; the Court ruled that plaintiffs could maintain
actions based on breach of express warranty, fraudulent
misrepresentation, and conspiracy to misrepresent or conceal.32 It will
certainly take years before the full scope of federal preemption is finally
resolved, but it is clear that there can be no liability based on the failure
of a cigarette manufacturer to warn about smoking-related hazards so
long as the congressionally-required warning is given.33 It is worth
noting here that in the Louisiana class action case, the plaintiff included
a grab-bag of claims which were not based on failure to warn.34 The
Complaint filed by the State of Florida also takes somewhat of a
shotgun approach, alleging ten counts, none of which expressly rely on
failure to warn as a basis of liability.3 5
There is some language in the Complaint that suggests reliance on
unsafe design as a theory of liability. Paragraph 70 alleges that "[t]he

30. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2613 (1992).
31. Id. at 2618. The Court in Cipollone ruled that causes of action based on pre-1969
failures to warn were not preempted by federal law. Id. However, the federal law creating the
Medicaid program was enacted by Congress in 1965, see Health Insurance for the Aged Act,
Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 344 (1965) (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.,
and 45 U.S.C. (1988)), and was not implemented in Florida until 1969, see 1969 Fla. Laws ch.
268 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 409.266 (1993)). Thus, the State would have had no pre-1969
medical expenses in connection with Medicaid recipients. See id.
32. See Cipollone, 112 S.Ct. at 2621-25 (plurality opinion). Although only four Justices
of the Supreme Court joined in the plurality opinion setting out the surviving causes of action,
see id. (plurality opinion), two other Justices concluded that the federally-mandated warning
preempted all claims. Id. at 2632 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part). Three Justices concluded that
no claims were preempted. Id. at 2625 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part). Thus, there was a 6-3
majority concluding that warning claims were preempted, and a 7-2 majority that the claims
listed in the text were not preempted.
33. As to federal preemption generally, see Richard C. Ausness, FederalPreemption of
State Products Liability Doctrines, 44 S.C. L. REV. 187 (1993).

34. See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544, 548 (E.D. La. 1995). The
substantive causes of action included "misrepresentation; intentional infliction of emotional
distress; negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress; violation of consumer
protection statutes under state law; breach of express warranty; breach of implied warranty; strict
product liability; and redhibition pursuant to the Louisiana Civil Code." Id.
35. See Complaint TI 141-208, Florida v. American Tobacco Co., Civ. No. 95-1466AO

(Fla. 15th Cir. Feb. 21, 1995).
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Tobacco Companies could have designed and manufactured a safer
cigarette, but refused to do so." 36 Whether that theory will succeed is
an intriguing question. In most states today, to prevail on a design
theory, the plaintiff must establish that there was a feasible and safer
alternative design that would have prevented the plaintiffs harm.37 The
benefit from smoking is the psychic satisfaction that smokers
get-satisfaction of the need to smoke with a drink or after a good
meal, for example, or satisfaction derived from the image the smoker
wishes to project.38 What is a safer cigarette, and would it satisfy these
"needs" as well as those currently marketed?
The counts in the Complaint do not rely specifically, however, on a
feasible alternative design theory. Count four of the Complaint alleges
that cigarettes are "unreasonably dangerous due to their design" for two
reasons: they are not as safe as ordinary consumers expect them to be,
and the dangers of cigarettes outweigh any benefits from their use.39
The first theory of design liability has its origins in warranty law, and
was adopted by section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as
the test of when a product was in a "defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user."' This "consumer expectations" perspective is
also embodied in the Florida pattern jury instructions.4 Whether this
will turn out to be a fruitful avenue for recovery is more problematic.
Consumer expectations as a test of design liability has come under
heavy fire of late, and may not survive as a viable basis of liability.42
Even if there is something left to the consumer expectations test,
how it will play out in the cigarette litigation is uncertain. People have
known for years-decades even-that smoking is unhealthy.43 On the

36. Id. 170.
37. See RESTATEMENT OF PRODuCTS LIABILITY, supra note 26, § 2(b) & cmt. c.
38. The Complaint goes into considerable detail of how cigarette "advertising is used to
create a mental image associating smoking with good health, glamorous and athletic lifestyles,
with success and sexual attractiveness." Complaint 99, American Tobacco Co.(Civ. No. 951466AO).
39. Id. 163.
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(l) (1965). The definitions in comment g
to § 402A of "defective condition," and in comment i of "unreasonably dangerous," are geared
to the perceptions of the ordinary consumer. Id. § 402A cmts. g & i.
41. See In re Standard Jury Instructions (Civil Cases), 435 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 1983).
Instruction PL 5 states in part: "A product is unreasonably dangerous because of its design if
[the product fails to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect ....]"Id. at 783
n.*.
42. The Restatement of Products Liability specifically rejects consumer expectations as
an independent basis of design liability. See RESTATEMENT OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note
26, § 2, cmt. f.
43. The author of this commentary recalls from his high school days, which preceded the
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other hand, the tobacco companies are in the somewhat unenviable
position of having to argue that it has not been established conclusively
that cigarettes are hazardous to the health, but if they are, then
everybody knows it. Perhaps they can avoid this dilemma by arguing
that the public perception of cigarettes, although erroneous, is that they
are harmful, even if they really are not. In any event, it is unlikely that
there are many in the general population of smokers who now believe,
or ever believed, that smoking cigarettes is harmless.
The second design theory of the Complaint is that the dangers of the
design outweigh any benefits." The allegation here might be that on
a risk/utility balancing, an alternative feasible and safer design was
available and should have been adopted. I have already addressed this
basis of liability.4" But the tone of this count suggests that the State
may be out for bigger game-cigarettes are defective even if there is no
safer alternative cigarette. This sort of per se defectiveness has been
described as "product-category liability,"46 and it has been accepted by
a few courts, although it no longer appears to be the law in any state.
The argument is that cigarettes are so dangerous and so devoid of social
1964 Surgeon General's Report on smoking-related health hazards by more years than he is
willing to admit, the description of cigarettes as "cancer sticks." Awareness of the adverse health
effects goes back even further in time. See, e.g., Austin v. State, 48 S.W. 305 (Tenn. 1898)
(upholding the constituttonality of a statute that made it illegal to sell cigarettes), aft'd, 179 U.S.
343 (1900). In so holding, the Supreme Court of Tennessee observed:
We think ...[cigarettes] are ...wholly noxious and deleterious to health. Their
use is always harmful, never beneficial. They possess no virtue, but are inherently
bad, and bad only. They find no true commendation for merit or usefulness in any
sphere. On the contrary, they are widely condemned as pernicious altogether.
Beyond question, their every tendency is towards the impairment of physical health
and mental vigor. There is no proof in the record as to the character of cigarettes;
yet their character is so well and so generally known to be that stated above that
the courts are authorized to take judicial cognizance of the fact. No particular proof
is required in regard to those facts, which, by human observation and experience,
have become well and generally known to be true; nor is it essential that they shall
have been formally recorded in written history or science to entitle courts to take
judicial notice of them.
id. at 306 (citations omitted). The court was unquestionably on stronger ground when it took
judicial notice of the harmful effects of smoking than it was in taking notice of the more valueladen conclusion that cigarettes have no true merit or usefulness. Id. at 308. Substitute "booze"
for "cigarettes" in this passage, and certainly many judges, at that time, and perhaps today as
well, would still agree with it.
44. Complaint 163, American Tobacco Co. (Civ. No. 95-1466AO).
45. See supra text accompanying notes 16-22.
46. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American ProductsLiability
Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263, 1297 (1991).
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utility that they should not be marketed at all, even if there is no
substitute. This theory appears to have had its genesis in O'Brien v.
Muskin Corp.,47 in which the court ruled that a vinyl liner of an aboveground swimming pool might be defective even in the absence of a
feasible and safer alternative-it might be so dangerous that the jury
could conclude that it should not have been marketed at all.4 ' A similar
approach was taken in Kelly v. R.G. Industries49 with respect to
handguns known as "Saturday Night Specials."5 And in Halphen v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,5 the court ruled that the theory might
apply to asbestos products. 2 However, state legislatures have stepped
in to overrule all three cases.53
The new Restatement of Products Liability takes an ambivalent
position with respect to this sort of product-category liability. The first
tentative draft specifically excluded such liability in Comment c:
The requirement in § 2(b) that plaintiff show a reasonable
alternative design applies even though the plaintiff alleges
that the category of product sold by the defendant is so
dangerous that it should not have been marketed at all.
Thus common and widely distributed products such as
alcoholic beverages, tobacco, firearms, and above ground
swimming pools may be found to be defective only upon
proof of the requisite conditions ...."
After some debate on the floor at the May 1994 meeting, a new
Comment was approved which provides in part:
d. Design defects: possibility of manifestly unreasonable
design.
Several courts have suggested that the designs of some
products are so manifestly unreasonable, in that they have
low social utility and high degree of danger, that liability
should attach even absent proof of a reasonable alternative
47. 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983), overruled by statute. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58c-3 (1982).
48. Id. at 306.
49. 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985), overruled by statute, MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 36-I
(1990).
50. Id. at 1159.
51. 484 So. 2d 110 (La. 1986), overruled by statute, LA. REV. STAT. § 9.2800.56(1) (West
1991).
52. Id.at 113.
53. See supra notes 47, 49, 51. In New Jersey and Louisiana, however, the statutes were
held not to be applicable retroactively. See Gilboy v. American Tobacco Co., 582 So. 2d 1263,
1264 (La. 1991); Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239, 1252 (N.J. 1990).
54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1994).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol46/iss4/4

10

Pearson: The Florida Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act
FLORIDA MEDICAID THIRD-PARTY LIABILTY ACT

design .... If a court were to adopt this characterization of
the product, it could conclude that liability should attach
without proof of a reasonable alternative design. The court
would condemn the product design as defective and not
reasonably safe because the extremely high degree of
danger posed by its use or consumption so substantially
outweighs its negligible utility that no rational adult, fully
aware of the relevant facts, would choose to use or
consume the product."
But in approving the new Comment d, the ALI left Comment c intact.
The two Comments appear to be in complete conflict, so that both those
arguing for and against product-category liability can find support.
The liability of tobacco manufacturers could not be established on
the basis of Comment c if there is no reasonable safer alternative. How
would the State fare if emphasis is given to Comment d? It is not likely
that the State will have any problem proving the down-side of
cigarettes-that they do cause harm, and considerable harm at that. The
problem, of course, is how the utility of a product is to be
measured-does utility include the psychic benefit that consumers
actually derive from the product-an empirically determined utility? If
so, it is hard to see how cigarettes could fall into the category of
products with "negligible utility." For whatever reason, a lot of people
seem to get a lot of enjoyment out of smoking.
Perhaps, however, the test is not the utility that people actually get
from the product, cigarettes for example, but the utility that "rational"
adults get-the test is whether a rational adult would "use or consume"
the product. Under such a "normative" approach to utility, it might be
seen as relatively easy for courts to conclude that rational adults would
not use cigarettes, no matter how many millions of cigarette smokers
there are. If a court were willing to impose its own notions of rationality
to determine that cigarettes have low social utility,56 there are other
products that could fall under the product-category liability hammer.
Alcoholic beverages come quickly to mind. There is no doubt that the
principal benefit that comes from the consumption of that drink before
dinner, or from a glass or two of wine with dinner, is psychic.57 The
55. RESTATEMENT OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 26, at cmt. d.
56. Would ajudge that smokes and gets enjoyment-utility-from smoking have to recuse
himself or herself? For that matter, would a nonsmoking judge be able to fairly make the value
judgment about whether the utility that smokers get from cigarettes is rational?
57. I am aware that some studies have recently touted the health benefits of a glass of
wine a day. But that benefit is just a side benefit and is almost totally irrelevant, I am sure, to
the psychic benefit that the drink provides. People certainly consumed two glasses of wine a
day, and then some, before any health benefits were revealed. And I wonder how many doctors
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harm, on the other hand, that comes from drinking is
enormous-rivaling, perhaps, even the harm that cigarette smoking
causes. If cigarettes fail to pass muster under a normative utility/benefit
test, it is hard to see how alcohol would." And there are many other
products the benefit of which is simply that they provide pleasure, even
though they involve considerable risk. Certainly, marijuana should not
be legalized. And indeed, often it is the risk-the thrill-that is the
attraction of some products. Parachutes used for recreational sky diving
and scuba equipment come quickly to mind. Fireworks also would be
subject to category liability; as inspiring as they might be at Fourth of
July celebrations, their only benefit is psychic.5 9
Whether the State can convince the Florida Supreme Court to adopt,
and if so, whether cigarettes should be subject to, product-category
liability is not at all clear."1 To the extent that products should be
banned from the marketplace because the risks outweigh the benefits by
a wide margin, or for any other reason for that matter, it is more
appropriate that the decision be made by the legislature, which has
wider access to the information necessary to make the required
balancing. Comment c to section 2 of the Restatement of Products
Liability makes just this point.6
would recommend that a teetotalling patient take up drinking for its health benefits. Not many,
I would guess.
58. One commentator has argued that alcoholic beverage manufacturers should be strictly
liable for injuries caused, not to the consumer, but to "innocent bystanders" who are injured by
someone else's overconsumption. See Robert F. Cochran, "Good Whiskey," Drunk Driving, and
Innocent Bystanders: The Responsibility of Manufacturers of Alcohol and Other Dangerous
Hedonic Productsfor Bystander Injury, 45 S.C. L. REV. 269, 271 (1994). Under the productcategory liability theory, alcohol manufacturers would be liable to all who are injured by
overconsumption of alcohol, including the over-consumers. Id. at 317-22.
59. It is interesting that cigars do not seem to have been the subject of the categoryliability debate. Perhaps they are not as widely used as cigarettes, and thus the total harm may
not be as great. And it may be that although the benefit from smoking cigars is psychic, that
benefit may be more socially acceptable. Thomas R. Marshall, Vice-President to Woodrow
Wilson, once observed, "What this country needs is a good five-cent cigar." JOHN BARTLETT,
FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 673 (15th ed. 1980). More recently, "Cigar Aficionado," a publication

calling itself "A magazine for men of exceptional taste," has emerged. The cover of the Summer
1995 issue shows a smiling Jack Nicholson, the well-known actor, brandishing a large stogie.
Featured articles include "Women and Cigars-The Hot New Trend," and "Rating Small
Cigars." On the other hand, cigars were banned in some restaurants and in most airlines long
before cigarettes were, suggesting that perhaps cigars involve external costs that cigarettes were
not perceived to have.
60. The Supreme Court of Louisiana has left open the possibility that cigarettes can be
so characterized. See Gilboy v. American Tobacco Co., 582 So. 2d 1263, 1265 (La. 1991).
61. RESTATEMENT OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 26, § 2, cmt. c states:

[C]ourts have not imposed liability for categories of products that are
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B. Other Theories Stated in the Complaint
The Complaint states a variety of other counts, which I shall discuss
here only briefly. I think that the State will have a hard time recovering
under most of the counts if it cannot establish that cigarettes are
defective in the products liability sense just discussed.
1. Count One: Restitution-Unjust Enrichment62
In tort actions, the measure of recovery is generally restorative-the
defendant is liable for the monetary equivalent of what it would take to
put the plaintiff in the pre-tort condition.63 Restitution is sometimes
available to a tort plaintiff, and in those cases the plaintiff is entitled to
recovery based on the benefit the defendant derived from the tort, rather
than what it would take to restore the plaintiff to the pre-tort
condition.' Restitution also is a remedy for "unjust enrichment"-cases
in which the defendant has not breached any contract or tort duty to the
plaintiff, but in which it would be "unjust" for the defendant to keep the
benefits reaped from the transaction.65
To the extent that the State is relying on restitution as a remedy for
tort, the State obviously must prove a tort. If the State is successful in
that regard, then resort to restitution is not necessary. If the State fails
to establish a tort, then to recover restitutionary damages the State must
establish that the defendants have been unjustly enriched in the absence
of any independent wrong.66 While count one does allege that the State
has discharged the defendants' obligation to pay the medical expenses
generated by cigarette smoking,67 that allegation seems nothing more
than another way of saying that the defendants have committed a wrong
toward the Medicaid recipients, and therefore the State.

generally available and widely used and consumed, solely on the ground
that they are considered socially undesirable by some segments of society.
Instead, courts have concluded that the issue is better suited to resolution
by legislatures and administrative agencies that can more appropriately
consider whether distribution of such product categories should be
prohibited.
Id.
62. Complaint
141-48, American Tobacco Co. (Civ. No. 95-1466AO).
63. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 7 (5th
ed. 1984).
64. See DAN. B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES ch. 4 (2d ed. 1993).
65. See id.
66. See id. at 553.
67. See Complaint
151-52, American Tobacco Co. (Civ. No. 95-1466AO).
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2. Count Two: Indemnity 6
This count appears to completely overlap count one, alleging the
right to recover in restitution. The allegation is that the State has paid
medical expenses on behalf of Medicaid recipients, as a result of which
the defendants have been unjustly enriched, and should for that reason
"indemnify" the State. 69 The State's right to indemnity would thus
depend on whether there is some basis in substantive law which would
create an obligation on the part of the defendants to pay for the
Medicaid's recipients smoking-related medical expenses. This count
alleges no such substantive basis.
3. Count Three: Negligence"
This appears to be a boilerplate count. The allegations are that the
defendants had a duty to use reasonable care in the manufacture and
distribution of their cigarettes, and that they breached that duty. 7 In the
end, whether the defendants could be found to have been negligent
would depend on whether cigarettes are defective in the products
liability sense. If they are, this separate negligence count is redundant.
If they are not, then it is hard to see how the defendants could be
negligent in producing and marketing nondefective products.
4. Count Five: Breach of Express and Implied Warranties72
One claim in this count is that the defendants have breached the
implied warranty of merchantability.73 To be merchantable under
section 2-314 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), the product
must be "fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used. 7 4 It is generally held that the U.C.C. concept of
unmerchantability and the strict tort liability concept of product defect
are identical.75 For that reason, the State's success on a breach of
warranty of merchantability claim would depend on whether cigarettes
are defective in the products liability sense.
The outcome under the express warranty claim may be less clear-cut,
but it is still in considerable doubt. Section 2-313 of the U.C.C. defines

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
149-54.
Id. 153.
Id.
155-59.
Id.
156-57.
Id.
166-72.
Id. 169.
U.C.C. § 2-314 (1994); FLA. STAT. § 672.314 (1993).
See, e.g., Duford v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 833 F.2d 407, 411-12 (1st Cir. 1987).
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an express warranty as an "affirmation of fact or promise made by the
seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the
basis of the bargain."76 The U.C.C. also provides that "an affirmation
merely of the value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely
the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a
warranty."77 Whether courts will determine that the typical advertising
and promotion of cigarettes are sufficient to create an express warranty
is an iffy proposition. Cigarette advertising has generally followed a
pattern of image creation rather than specific statements about any
particular characteristic. In one recent case,78 the court dismissed an
express warranty claim against tobacco manufacturers on the grounds
that the advertising and promotional materials relied upon by the
plaintiff did not constitute express warranties as to health.7 9 The
Complaint does not contain any allegation that the advertising and
promotion of cigarettes contained any specific statements that smoking
will not cause harm.
5. Count Six: Negligent Performance of a Voluntary Undertaking,"0
and Count Seven: Intentional Misrepresentation 8
Although these two counts appear to be aimed at different sorts of
conduct-in count six, negligence and in count seven, intentional
misrepresentation-the allegations in both are quite similar. The
allegations in count six are that the defendants "knowingly and actively"
published "fraudulent science,"82 and "suppressed negative research

76.
77.
78.
79.

U.C.C. § 2-313 (1994); FLA. STAT. § 672.313(1)(a) (1993).
U.C.C. § 2-313 (1994); FLA. STAT. § 672.313(2) (1993).
Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 884 F. Supp. 1515 (D. Kan. 1995).
Id. at 1527-28. The court observed:

Granted, the advertisements do tend to portray smoking in a positive light, through
the use of professional athletes, movie stars, and other attractive persons shown
enjoying cigarettes. The advertisements also refer to the subject cigarettes variously
as "mild" and "smooth." Indeed, the positive representation of smoking presented
in the advertisements would be an inducement to purchase the cigarettes, but such
a result is the very purpose strived for in all advertising. The mere fact that
smoking is portrayed in a positive manner does not, as plaintiff contends, lead to
a conclusion that such advertisements expressly warrant that smoking "does not
present any significant health consequences." In fact, health consequences are not
discussed in any of the advertisements.
Id.
80. Complaint 1 173-79, American Tobacco Co. (Civ. No. 95-1466AO).
8 1. Id. l 180-87.
82. Id. 175.
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data regarding cigarettes and health." 3 Count seven is more detailed
in the allegations, but like count six, focuses on the suppression of
information and intentional misstatements about the health risks of
smoking.84
Claims based on fraudulent misrepresentation are not preempted by
the federal law establishing the form and content of warnings as to the
hazards of cigarette smoking." The allegations in the Complaint that
seem closest to supporting these counts rely on communications made
to the public at large, and not to individual purchasers as such.86 As a
result, the underlying basis of liability looks like "public
misrepresentation" as that cause of action, is defined in section 402B of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts.87 Under this theory, it is not
necessary that the representation be the product of fraudulent intent, or
even negligence; it is enough if it is inaccurate. 8 Whether there can be
recovery for misrepresentation depends, of course, on what the
defendants said. Like statements alleged to constitute an express
warranty," general statements relating to quality designed to promote
a product are not sufficient to constitute the kind of representations as
to which liability can attach.9" Furthermore, not only must there be
reliance on the representation by the consumer, but that reliance must
be justifiable as well.9 It is just too soon to tell whether the State will

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. 176.
See id.
181-84.
Cipollone, 112 S.Ct. at 2623-24.
See Complaint
167-68, American Tobacco Co. (Civ. No. 95-1466AO).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1965). This provision states:

One engaged in the business of selling chattels who, by advertising, labels, or
otherwise, makes to the public a misrepresentation of a material fact concerning the
character or quality of a chattel sold by him is subject to liability for physical harm
to a consumer of the chattel caused by justifiable reliance upon the
misrepresentation, even though
(a) it is not made fraudulently or negligently, and
(b) the consumer has not bought the chattel from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
Id.
88. See id.
89. See supra text accompanying note 78.
90. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B cmt. g (1965), which states: "[This
section] does not apply to statements of opinion, and in particular it does not apply to the kind
of loose general praise of wares sold which, on the part of the seller, is considered to be 'sales
talk,' and is commonly called 'puffing'...." Id.
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B cmt. j (1965). "[This section] does not
apply where the misrepresentation is not known, or there is indifference to it, and it does not
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be successful on these counts.
6. Count Eight: Conspiracy and Concert of Action,92 and Count
Nine: Aiding and Abetting Liability93
These counts also overlap each other considerably. Under the
preceding counts, each defendant would be liable only for harm that that
defendant caused, and for that reason allocation of the damages among
the various defendants would be a daunting task, one likely doomed to
fail. The purpose of these two counts is very likely to permit the
application of joint and several liability, so that all the defendants will
each be liable for the total damages.94 Thus, these counts do not allege
any substantive bases of liability not already covered by the preceding
counts. Success here will depend on whether the State can prove the
kind of concerted action necessary to support joint and several liability.
Count eight does allege that the defendants did form two organizations,
the Tobacco Institute and the Council for Tobacco Research: two
instrumentalities by which the conspiracies were allegedly
implemented,95 but otherwise the allegations are fairly general.
7. Count Ten: Injunctive Relief"
Like counts eight and nine, this count is essentially procedural, and
asks the court to order the defendants to cease their wrongful behavior
and to take steps to eliminate the effects of their past behavior.97 As to
the latter, for example, the State asks the court to order the defendants
to finance a "corrective public education campaign relating to the issues
of smoking and health."98
The purpose of this count-by-count discussion is not to provide the
last word on the chances of the State's success. Perhaps the State's
strongest case will be under counts six and seven involving
misrepresentation.99 But even those counts will present problems for

influence the purchase of subsequent conduct." Id.
92. Complaint [ 188-98, American Tobacco Co. (Civ. No. 95-1466AO).
199-204.
93. Id.
94. The Act does provide for the possibility of market share liability under some
circumstances. See FLA. STAT. § 409.910(9)(b) (Supp. 1994). But that kind of liability is
different from the joint and several liability that would attach if the State prevails on these
counts.
95. Complaint 9M 191-96, American Tobacco Co. (Civ. No. 95-1466AO).
96. Id. T 205-08.
97. Id. 1 208.
98. Id.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 80-91.
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the State. One thing is fairly sure: even if the constitutional issues are
resolved in favor of the State, and that will take some time, the State
can expect a long, hard fight-one that is not likely to be resolved for
many years. Furthermore, it is not clear that at the end of that fight the
State will emerge the winner.
III. THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW CAUSE OF ACTION
The Complaint alleges causes of action not only based on the Act,
but grounded in the common law as well.'"" Apart from subrogation,
which I have already discussed,'"" I am not sure just what independent
common law cause of action the State has in mind. I can think of no
case in which the plaintiff has recovered a loss based on harm to
another, in which the theory of recovery is independent of, not
derivative from, the other's right to recover. The State can certainly ask
the Supreme Court of Florida to create such a right, but I think that the
court is unlikely to do so. The common law develops by analogy, and
I can think of no analogous right to the State's theory of recovery.
Furthermore, it seems unlikely that the clurt itself would create an
independent action in favor of the State if the Legislature has
specifically refused to do so.
IV. SCOPE OF THE ACT-PERSONS LIABLE
While the discussion after the Act was passed indicated that its
drafters and the Florida Legislature intended it to apply to cigarette
manufacturers, the Act is not so limited. The Act gives the State the
authority to recover from any "liable third party."'' r I have already
mentioned manufacturers of alcoholic beverages as candidates for
liability under the Act." 3 To the extent that the State can prevail on
a products liability theory,"' intermediate sellers in the chain of
distribution of cigarettes would also be exposed to liability. 5
Nor are "liable third parties" limited to product sellers, but include
anyone who has caused the need for medical treatment of a Medicaid
recipient. Thus, a person who has negligently injured a recipient in an
automobile accident is subject to liability under the Act. And under the
100. Complaint 3, American Tobacco Co. (Civ. No. 95-1466AO).
101. See supra text accompanying notes 16-22.
102. FLA. STAT. § 409.910(f) (Supp. 1994).
103. See supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
104. See supra part II.A.
105. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, which the Supreme Court of Florida
adopted in West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 86 (1976), imposes strict liability on
any seller of a defective product. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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Act, that third party would be liable to the State without regard to any
defenses, such as comparative negligence, which would be available in
a suit brought directly by the recipient.
V. PROOF AND ALLOCATION OF DAMAGES

Assuming that the State can surmount all of the difficulties suggested
so far in this commentary, and the constitutional arguments made by
Professor Van Alstyne and the defendants, there remains the problem of
how the amount of medical expenses to which the State is entitled will
be calculated. Clearly, the State is not entitled to reimbursement for all
expenditures for medical care of Medicaid recipients-the State will
have to establish how much of the total expenditures were caused by.
smoking cigarettes. The Act has two provisions designed to ease the
burden that the State would normally have in proving damages. First,
the State need not identify by name the individual recipients, but rather
can recover based on "payments made on behalf of an entire class of
' ' °6 Second, "[t]he issue of causation and damages ... may
recipients.U
be proven by use of statistical analysis.""' 7 While both may simplify
somewhat proof of damages, difficult problems of proof will still
remain.
Although the Act does not require the State to list the Medicaid
recipients for whom medical expenditures have been made, the State
will, I imagine, have to establish who among the recipients are, or have
been, smokers. This might be less of a problem than it would appear to
be at first. Sampling methods could perhaps be used instead of asking
each recipient for his or her smoking history.
But after the relevant number of smokers is determined, how much
of the State's total Medicaid expenditures for medical treatment should
be allocated to smoking? Obviously, statistical proof will be required
here-but proof as to what? We do see from time to time assertions that
smoking adds so many billions of dollars to the cost of medical care,
but statistics like that hardly help. There might be studies as to the
percentage increase in medical expenses paid, but the defendants no
doubt will argue that the State has to come up with valid and reliable
statistics. Permitting the use of statistical analysis does not mean that the
State can use any set of statistics it comes up with. The problem will be
complicated by the fact that some recipients who do not smoke now
may have smoked at some time in the past. Furthermore, current
medical- expenses may be affected by how long the recipient smoked,

106. FLA. STAT. § 409.910(9)(a) (Supp. 1994).
107. Id. § 409.910(9).
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and how long ago he of she quit. Information like that could be
produced by the sampling process, but linking the results of that sample
to the total of Medicaid medical expenses to arrive at an allocation of
the expenses will not be easy."'
Assuming that some acceptable gross figure of Medicaid medical
expenditures attributable to smoking can be arrived at, how will the
damages based on those expenditures be allocated among the
defendants? After all, not all of the smoking recipients smoked
cigarettes manufactured by all of the defendants. In suits by individual
smokers against tobacco companies, the allegations usually are that the
plaintiff smoked one, or perhaps two brands over a smoking
lifetime."° The Complaint, and the Act, indicate two ways to help the
State avoid this allocation problem.
First, the Act provides that liability of the defendants shall be joint
and several."' Joint and several liability would ordinarily apply in a
case like this only if the defendants acted in concert to cause the harm,
or if they acted independently to cause indivisible harm."' The latter
theory would not be available unless all recipients smoked cigarettes
manufactured by all the defendants-something both unlikely to have
happened and unlikely to be capable of proof. Concert of action as a
basis of joint and several liability is the more likely theory, and the
complaint does contain allegations that the defendants did indeed engage
in behavior which, if proven, would support joint and several
liability.' 12
One theory worth mentioning in passing, although the complaint does
108. Whether smoking causes a net loss to society is the subject of an intriguing analysis
in W. KIP Viscusi, CIGARETTE TAXATION AND THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING

(1994), one of a Working Paper Series of the National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Professor Viscusi argues, with statistical back-up, that the costs to both smokers and nonsmokers
is more than offset by the savings resulting from the early deaths of smokers-savings in
expenses, for example, for nursing home care and medical treatment. Id. at 29-33. It is unlikely,
however, that tobacco companies would want to argue from the premise that smoking in fact
causes early death.
109. See, e.g., Bruton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 884 F. Supp. 1515 (D. Kan. 1995),
in which the plaintiff alleged that in a 43-year period he smoked Camels and Luckie Strikes. If
that is the testimony, it perhaps would have to be accepted, at least for the purpose of
determining whether the plaintiff can get to the jury. Issues of credibility are usually for the jury
to resolve. But the author of this commentary smoked for a shorter period than that, and while
he cannot recall all the brands he smoked, he is sure that the cigarettes of more than two
manufacturers were involved. It is hard to believe that his smoking pattern it atypical.
l10. FLA. STAT. 409.9 10(1) (Supp. 1994).
111. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 63, § 52.
112. See Complaint
188-98, American Tobacco Co. (Civ. No. 95-1466AO) (containing
count eight-Conspiracy and Concert of Action); id. 199-204 (containing count nine-Aiding
and Abetting Liability); supra part I.B.
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not specifically rely on it, is what has come to be known as "alternative
liability." It originated in a famous California case familiar to all first
year Torts students-Summers v. Tice."' The plaintiff and the two
defendants were hunting." 4 The defendants negligently shot in the
direction of the plaintiff, and a single shotgun pellet lodged in the
plaintiff's eye and another in his lip." 5 Both defendants fired shells
using the same size shot, so it was impossible to tell which defendant
fired the shot which injured the plaintiff."6 The court shifted the
burden of proof of cause to the defendants, asserting that it was fairer
for the innocent plaintiff to recover than to permit both negligent
defendants to escape liability, even though one defendant did not cause
the harm to the plaintiff."7 The State might argue that putting
cigarettes on the market where the recipients could buy them is
analogous to firing in the direction of the recipients. But some courts
have rejected the application of alternative liability in cases involving
a large number of potential causes." 8
The second device that the Act makes available to the State to help
it overcome the problems of proving which manufacturer caused harm
to which recipients is "market share" liability. The Act provides that the
State can "proceed under a market share theory, provided that the
products involved are substantially interchangeable among brands, and
that substantially similar factual or legal issues would be involved in
seeking recovery against each liable third party individually." ' 9
Market share liability originated in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,"°
a case involving plaintiffs who alleged that their mothers took DES to
prevent miscarriages, but which ended up causing harm to the
plaintiffs.'2 ' DES was a generic drug, and it was taken by the mothers
many years before harm showed up in the plaintiffs." As a result, it
was not possible, the complaint alleged, for the plaintiffs to prove which
DES manufacturer actually manufactured the DES taken by each
plaintiff's mother.'" In ruling that the complaint should not be

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

199 P.2d I (Cal. 1948).
Id.at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 5.
See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924, 931 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912

(1980).
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

FLA. STAT. § 409.910(9)(b) (Supp. 1994).
607 P.2d 924, 931 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
Id. at 925-26.
Id.at 925.
Id.at 929.
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dismissed for failure to make a sufficient allegation of cause, the court
created market share liability, under which each defendant would be
liable for a share of the plaintiffs' damages geared to the share of the
DES market held by each defendant.'24
It is not clear that market share liability would be applicable to a
case involving harm alleged to have been caused by cigarettes. Market
share liability necessarily assumes that the manufacturers all sell the
same product, and thus share the same market. That was true of
DES-it was a generic drug that had to be produced in accordance with
a formula approved by the Food and Drug Administration. 5 While the
Florida Supreme Court has adopted a variation of the Sindell market
share theory with respect to DES,' 26 it has rejected the theory in a case
involving harm alleged to have been caused by asbestos because of the
differences between asbestos products-there is no single asbestos
product. 2 7
The Act does recognize the problem by requiring that the products
be "substantially interchangeable among brands,"' 28 and there is an
allegation in the Complaint that cigarettes are so interchangeable.'2 9
But it is not true that all cigarettes are identical in design. Some have
more tar than others, or more nicotine; some are sold with filters, some
*without; some are longer than others. Any one of these design
differences might have an impact on the harm that can be caused by
smoking. 3 ° Thus, the applicability of market share liability as a way
of avoiding the cause of the problem will have to await proof at the
trial.

124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 930-31.
See id. at 926.
See Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275, 286 (Fla. 1990).
Celotex Corp. v. Copeland, 471 So. 2d 533, 537-38 (Fla. 1985). The court observed:

DES was produced by hundreds of companies pursuantto one formula. As a result,
all DES had identical physical properties and chemical compositions and,
consequently, all DES prescribed to pregnant women created the same risk of harm
to the women's female offspring.
Asbestos products, on the other hand, have widely divergent toxicities, with
some asbestos products presenting a much greater risk of harm than others.
Id. (citations omitted).
128. FLA. STAT. § 409.910(9)(b) (Supp. 1994).

129. Complaint 6, American Tobacco Co. (Civ. No. 95-1466AO).
130. For a discussion of the health effects of the lowering of the tar content of cigarettes,
see VICUSI, supra note 108, at 14-19.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This is not a complete analysis of all the issues that will arise should
the State's Medicaid reimbursement claim go forward. The purpose here
is rather to suggest that if the legislature and the drafters of the Act
think that they have done something dramatic to save Medicaid in
Florida, they are mistaken. It is by no means clear that the Act will
yield the State one cent from the tobacco companies. Even if the State
surmounts the problems of recovering expenditures suggested in this
commentary, the problems of constitutionality remain. And even if the
State succeeds on the constitutional arguments, the final resolution of all
these problems will, I am confident in predicting, take years. The
tobacco companies will fight this case every step of the way, and if
there is recovery some day, it will not be soon. And one more "and
even"-and even if the State, years down the road, is successful, it will
not get full reimbursement of its Medicaid expenditures. Costs and
attorney's fees will no doubt absorb a significant portion of whatever it
is that the defendants will have to pay.
Of course, when the dust has settled, and if the State does ultimately
prevail, recovery of something from cigarette manufacturers from the
State's perspective will be better than nothing. But it may not be better
than another avenue by which the State can get cigarette manufacturers
to reimburse the State for Medicaid expenditures. That other avenue is
one that is already travelled by the State, and it's called a sales tax.
If the thought is that tobacco companies should pay more to the State
than they now do, a sales tax, rather than something that looks like a
tort suit, is the more efficient way to accomplish that goal. It has been
estimated that about 1.3 billion packs of cigarettes are sold in Florida
each year.' At that level of sales, an additional tax of $1 per pack
would provide in one year close to the $1.4 billion that it has been
reported the State is seeking in its action under the Act.3 3 An
additional tax has the advantages of being quick and efficient. Had the
Legislature passed a tax increase in 1994, revenue would be flowing to
the State today by which Medicaid expenses would be offset. And the
State would not have to share the revenue with anyone-no lawyers
would be needed, and the existing tax collection system could no doubt
absorb the collection of the additional tax at no significant increase in
expense.
Why not a tax increase, then? There might be a number of reasons
131. See Tim Nickens, FloridaLeads Way on Tobacco Baltlefront-Chilesto Use Tough
New Law, MIAMI HERALD, May 27, 1994, at Al.
132. See Lloyd Dunkelberger, Bill Aiding Tobacco Is Vetoed, GAINESVILLE SUN, June 16,
1994, at B5.
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why the State would prefer the Act to a tax, as cumbersome, expensive,
and time consuming as the former will be. One is that taxes are just not
popular. A tax on cigarettes makes it sound more like the consumers are
paying the State, rather than the cigarette manufacturers. That is true,
but consumers would end up paying, through higher prices, the costs to
the tobacco companies generated through the Act, just as much as they
would if an additional tax were added to the price of cigarettes.
It might be, however, that a tax would hit Florida residents harder
than the tort-like damages under the Act. A tax would be paid only on
cigarettes sold in Florida, while the reimbursement under the Act would
be included in the general cost of the production and sale of cigarettes.
Under the Act, the manufacturers would either increase the price of all
cigarettes wherever sold, or allocate all the loss to Florida. If the former,
the residents of other states would pick up part of the tab. I have no
idea which course the tobacco companies would follow. I do assume
that it would be possible for them to follow the latter, and charge more
for cigarettes sold in Florida than elsewhere. But I do not know whether
that game would be worth the candle to them.
Another reason why the State would prefer Medicaid reimbursement
through the Act is the effect that the increase in the price would have
on cigarette sales, and thus the total amount of tax revenue collected. A
tax would increase the price of cigarettes and would likely lead to a
decline in the sales of cigarettes in Florida for two reasons. First,
persons at the margin would be moved not to smoke in the first place,
or to quit smoking, or to smoke less. A combination of these behavior
reactions to the price increase would result in fewer cigarettes sold in
Florida, and for that reason less revenue from a tax increase.'33 On
balance, the State would no doubt view a reduction in smoking as a
good thing, but it would have an adverse impact on revenue.
The second way that a price increase could affect cigarette sales
would be through the increased purchase of cigarettes out of State for
use in Florida. Anyone who has driven Interstate 95 through North
Carolina knows that cigarettes are a good bit cheaper there than they are
in Florida, and one would be entitled to guess with some confidence that
some of those cigarettes purchased in North Carolina are actually
133. See VISCUSI, supra note 108, at 2:
Not only is the demand for smoking quite elastic and similar to that of many other
goods, but the long-run elasticity is even greater than in the short run. As a result,
economists ...have estimated that the long-run revenue effects of cigarette taxes
will be less dramatic than the short-run gains.
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smoked in Florida. Any dramatic increase in the price of cigarettes here
would probably result in an increase in the amount of out-of-state
purchases of less expensive cigarettes for use in Florida, and a
concomitant decrease in the sale of cigarettes, and of tax revenue, in
Florida.
Of course, even if the State recovers from the tobacco manufacturers
by way of the Act, the price of cigarettes will go up, and fewer
cigarettes will be sold in Florida. But the Medicaid reimbursement
recovery would not depend, at least in the short run, on the number of
cigarettes sold in Florida. For that reason, such recovery, if there ever
is any, might be a more dependable and certain recovery than that
resulting from a tax increase.
On balance, however, I think that the scales tip rather heavily in
favor of a tax rather than the Act as a way of seeking payment from
cigarette manufacturers for smoking-related Medicaid expenditures. The
transaction costs needed to seek recovery by way of the Act will be
enormous. These costs include not just the direct costs to the litigants
of fighting the case out in court, but the indirect costs to the State
resulting from the absorption of judicial resources necessary for the
litigation. The Florida court system is now strained close to the breaking
point, and a case of this magnitude will require resources which might
better be allocated to other pressing needs. And it is by no means clear
that the enormous effort will, in the end, produce anything of value to
the State.
However, this commentary should not be viewed as an argument in
favor of a tax. Cigarettes are already rather heavily taxed. In addition to
the usual sales tax, cigarettes are taxed at the rate of $.339 per pack.TM
On the estimated sales of 1.3 billion packs sold annually in Florida,
cigarettes generate a total tax revenue of $440,700,000 a year above the
sales tax revenue. Thus, in responding to the Governor's assertion that
the State's smoking-related medical expenditures is "a bill that tobacco
companies ought to pay,"' 35 the companies might reply that they have
already paid it. 36 But whether it is "fair" for cigarette manufacturers,
and ultimately smokers, to contribute more to the State coffers than this
is something as to which I take no position. If it is not fair, then the Act
should be abandoned for that reason. If the political process determines
that it is fair, then an additional tax, rather than the cumbersome, time-

134.

FLA. STAT.

§ 210.02 (1993).

135. See Dunkelberger, supra note 132, at B5.
136. According to Professor Viscusi, existing cigarette taxes are more than adequate to
compensate for what he calls the "externality costs" of smoking. See ViscusI, supra note 108,

at 46-49.
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consuming, inefficient tort-like litigation required by the Act, is the
better way.
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